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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Although soundly defeated in the early to mid-1990s,
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) did not disappear. Over
the past five years, it has reemerged in a substantially
different form, with both a military and a political
component. The organization, once again coordinated by
jailed leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, has eschewed
shorter-term military objectives in favor of a longer-term
strategy of slowly rebuilding popular support and
establishing a party within the Peruvian political system. In
so doing, it has also moved from extreme Maoist ideological
rigidity to a more pragmatic, though perhaps only tactical,
approach. Financial support is derived once again from
cocaine production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga
Valley (UHV). Although there may be some individual
exceptions, Shining Path is not a narcoterrorist organization.
At the same time, Sendero is still very small, in no way a
threat to the Peruvian state, and divided. The Lima-based
political organization and the military wing in the UHV
continue to follow Guzmán‟s leadership, while the
Apurímac-Ene Valleys (VRAE) group remains committed to
the armed struggle. The Government of Peru (GOP) response
to date, both military and civilian, has been inadequate.
VRAE military operations are hampered by poor leadership,
ill-trained troops, and an outdated strategy. VRAE
development resources have been cut, and the long-promised
paved road remains in the planning stage. Without
significant GOP adjustments, Shining Path is likely to
continue to grow.
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SENDERO IS BACK
This radical and largely home-grown Maoist guerrilla
organization is back. It was the scourge of Peru in the 1980s
and early 1990s before the government adopted a new
counterinsurgency approach that successfully overcame the
threat. Shining Path (Sendero, Sendero Luminoso, SL) is still
a shadow of its former self and in no way represents a threat
to the Peruvian state. However, the signs of its renewed
presence in some parts of the country are unmistakable and a
source of concern.
Map of Peru

Source:http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=peru+map&view=detail&id=81CF23EE71
D8B3C43A39C804630B9FE68419E504&first=1&FORM=IDFRIR
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For some years, it was widely believed that Sendero had, for
all intents and purposes, disappeared. After all, SL‟s
maximum leader, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, was captured
in a spectacular raid in September 1992. In addition, the
organization had been progressively dismantled through
cadre roundups, sympathizer rehabilitation, and rural microdevelopment programs, among other initiatives.
Such a view, however understandable, has proven to be
premature. SL has in fact slowly regrouped over the past five
years as the result of government indifference and
incompetence, as well as due to revamped approaches by
Sendero militant remnants and supporters of the group.1
The return of Sendero as a force to be reckoned with can be
explained by considering several factors. A number of them
relate to the guerrilla organization itself. One factor is the
group‟s return to its original Maoist-inspired goal of
achieving power through an extended, long-term peoples‟
war. In the aftermath of defeat, Guzmán and other surviving
members of the leadership belatedly recognized that they
were mistaken in concluding that they could achieve military
victory quickly in the early 1990s. In spite of “objective
conditions” favorable to the insurgents at the time, given a
deep and extended economic decline and a severely
weakened and discredited national government, Sendero
leaders overlooked their own limitations as well as the shift
in military and police counterinsurgency strategy then taking
place.2
1

Joshua Partlow, “In Peru, a Rebellion Reborn,” The Washington Post,
12 November, 2008; Arthur Bryce, “Shining Path Rebels Stage a
Comeback in Peru,” CNN.com, 21, April, 2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/04/21/peru.shining.path/;
Carmen Mendoza, “Sendero está de nuevo en San Marcos,” Perú 21, 16
June, 2010.
2
David Scott Palmer, “Terror in the Name of Mao: Revolution and
Response in Peru,” in Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds.
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A second is a shift in tactics to avoid some of the most
serious mistakes of the past. Sendero Luminoso appears to
have eschewed its earlier ideological rigidity. Over the
course of the 1980s, such unwavering certainty led to an
imposed organizational orthodoxy and repression on the
presumptive beneficiaries of its radical Maoist-inspired
revolution, the indigenous peasants themselves. It has turned
instead to building constructive relationships with those local
populations where it has a presence, as in the Apurímac-Ene
(VRAE) and Upper Huallaga valleys where Víctor Quispe
Palomino‟s (aka José) “Proseguir” faction is operating.
Members now work the fields with peasants there, pay for
needed supplies, and visit peasant communities to
acknowledge past errors and to promise not to repeat them.
They appear to have succeeded in rebranding themselves as a
“kinder, gentler group…at least tacitly accepted by rural
communities and by the very self-defense committees that
played a pivotal role in the original SL‟s defeat.”3
Other militants are also present among potential allies,
especially in some Lima and provincial universities (such as
the University of San Marcos and the University of Callao in
the capital, and the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga
– UNSCH, in Ayacucho, where Sendero originated in the
1960s) and in regional defense fronts.4 These latter groups
were originally set up by local organizations, usually leftist
in orientation, to advance their interests and to pressure
regional and municipal governments through protest marches

“Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past” (Washington
DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007), 208-213.
3
U.S. Embassy, Peru “Confidential Cable 235679: Sendero Luminoso:
Incremental Gains in Mixed Picture,” Wikileaks, 19 November, 2009.
(Made public by Wikileaks, 2010.); Mariano Aronés, Interview by David
Scott Palmer, Ayacucho, 16 August, 2010.
4
Alberto Bolivar, Interview by David Scott Palmer, Lima, 13 August,
2010; Jorge García Blásquez, Interview by David Scott Palmer. 27 July,
2010.

4

and occasional attacks on government buildings to secure
responses to their demands.
A third element is the return to past practices which had
proved to be successful, such as the organization and
expansion of armed cadre for selective attacks on
government forces in areas where Sendero holds the
advantage of intimate knowledge of local terrain, particularly
Peru: Areas Where Sendero Luminiso Has Operated
And Areas Of Coca Cultivation

Source:http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=mapa+sendero+luminoso&view=detail&id=
88065BD98C0C58B5DB3EDD874737B27F7203C8C8&first=1&FORM=IDFRIR
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in it‟s jungle redoubts in the Apurímac-Ene (VRAE) and
Upper Huallaga river valleys. A related component that
builds on past successes is a return to the generation of
resources through drug production and trafficking, including
guarding “mules” transporting cocaine from the jungle
across the sierra to coastal gathering points for shipment.
These resources, as in the late 1980s, provide the means to
obtain weapons, to pay for supplies, and to support cadres
and their operations.5
A fourth factor in the regeneration of some level of
organizational capacity and central direction is the ability in
recent years of Sendero’s jailed chief, Abimael Guzmán, to
communicate with supporters in the field. This enables the
organization‟s founder to provide ideological, strategic, and
tactical guidance and to reestablish a sense of organizational
coherence, at least among those who continue to see him as
their maximum leader. Guzmán has been able to do so as the
result of prison policy changes instituted by the Valentín
Paniagua transitional government (2000-2001) and his
successor, Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), changes that have
continued under President Alan García Pérez (2006-2011).
These shifts responded to pressures by the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) to institute a more
humane approach to the incarcerated as well as a desire by
these successive elected governments to demonstrate their

5

There is a view, subscribed to by some Peruvian and other analysts and
many Peruvian government officials that Shining Path has become a
narcoterrorist organization, similar to the FARC in Colombia, which has
lost its ideological orientation and is now little more than a drug
trafficking organization. The authors do not believe this characterization
accurately reflects current Sendero operations. Simón Romero, “Cocaine
Trade Helps Rebels Reingnite War in Perú,” The New York Times, 18
March, 2009; Andrew Whalen, “Tráfico de cocaína revitaliza a
guerrilleros peruanos,” El Nuevo Herald, 10 May, 2010; INFOREGIÓN,
“El 2010 fue un año perdido en la lucha contra las drogas en el VRAE,”
11 January, 2011.
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democratic bona fides after the increasingly authoritarian
policies of the Alberto Fujimori government (1990-2000).6
Shining Path‟s expanding presence and growing capacity
also relate to the generally ineffective government policies in
recent years. Once the imminent threat posed by Sendero had
passed with the defeat and disarticulation of the organization
and most of its leadership either dead or in jail, successive
administrations have moved on to other concerns.
The Specialized Intelligence Group (DIRCOTE’s Grupo
Especial de Inteligencia or GEIN) that tracked guerrilla
leaders and was responsible for their capture was disbanded
and absorbed into the National Intelligence Service (SIN).
DINCOTE, now DIRCOTE (the Counter-Terrorist
Directorate National Police of Peru that is responsible for
Peru's anti-terrorist law enforcement efforts), charged with
gathering information on internal threats, entered into
reorganization between 1992 and 1994 and no longer has the
operational capacity of earlier years.7
In addition, the extremely successful rural microdevelopment programs established by the now discredited
Fujimori government in the early 1990s were either ended or
changed in ways that no longer responded to specific
articulated local needs.8 These programs were targeted at the
6

Alberto Bolivar, "E-Notes: The Return of Shining Path - FPRI."
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 5 April, 2002,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20020405.bolivar.returnofshiningpath.html;
Orazio Potestá, “No dejemos respirar a Abimael Guzmán Reynoso. Dice
que Presidente Gonzalo ha ordenado reclutar a centenares de terroristas
liberados,” Correo, 8 June, 2002; Raúl Gonzales, “Abimael Guzmán
dirige SL desde la Base Naval,” Correo, 30 June, 2003; EFE 2003;
Benedicto Jiménez, “Guzmán debe ser aislado para abortar
recomposición de SL,” Correo, June 30, 2003.
7
El Comercio, 1994.
8
For example, in 2007-2008 President Alan García Pérez reduced the
budget, centralized operations, and changed the mission of one of the
most successful of the microdevelopment organizations, the Fondo
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200 poorest districts of the country, often in areas where
Shining Path had been most active. Between 1993 and 1998,
they significantly reduced poverty with small-scale programs
selected and overseen by elected members of the community
while simultaneously establishing an effective government
presence.9
An economic initiative to provide resources for access road
paving and development of the river valleys and adjacent
areas of the VRAE has languished. This is in spite of the fact
that the region is both a major source of coca production and
a haven for many of the remaining armed SL militants.
Although declared to be a high priority by successive
governments, the road has still not been paved to enable
local farmers to export their legal crops. 10 In a quite
inexplicable decision, the García administration actually
reduced by over 15 percent Fiscal Year 2011 funding for the
VRAE development initiative.11
Furthermore, when the military responded to increased
Shining Path activity in the area in 2009 with a major
initiative (Operación Excelencia), it repeated mistakes of the
Nacional de Cooperación de Desarrollo Social (FONCODES) to provide
larger rural development programs without local input.
9
David Scott Palmer, “FONCODES y su impacto en la pacificación en el
Perú:
Observaciones generales y el caso de Ayacucho,” in Fondo Nacional de
Compensación y Desarrollo Nacional (FONCODES), (ed.) Concertando
para el desarrollo: Lecciones aprendidas del FONCODES en sus
estrategias de intervención (Lima: Gráfica Medelius, 2001).
10
There is a parallel here to what U.S. officials in Afghanistan realize is
needed to improve their non-military efforts against insurgents. “You can
drill a well in a day, and build a school in a month… but it takes a long,
long time to build a road. When you start a road, you send a message that
it isn‟t a month-long partnership – it is for the long haul.” Di Giovanni,
Janine, "Book Review: „The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars
in the Midst of a Big One‟" The New York Times, 24 April, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/books/review/DiGiovanni-t.html.
11
ANDINA, 2009; La Voz de Huamanga, 2010; El Comercio, 2011.
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1980s by emphasizing military operations over a “hearts and
minds” civic action campaign and lost two helicopters and
over 50 troops, mostly conscripts. In spite of a lack of
success, military forces continue to operate in close
proximity to fixed bases and do not mingle or work with
local civilian populations. Conscripts rather than Special
Forces continue to comprise the troops in the VRAE, and a
general sent to command the military there in 2009 had no
prior experience in counterinsurgency operations.12
SENDERO IS UNDERESTIMATED
Such a set of continuing ineffective, even counterproductive,
official responses suggest that central government has once
again underestimated Sendero’s modest but growing
operational capacity. What might explain a policy of giving a
low priority to a reemerging problem that at one point in the
early 1990s threatened to overwhelm the state itself?
One part of the answer might lie, as during much of the
1980s, with the absence of any perceived threat to Lima,
Peru‟s capital, residence of one-third of the country‟s
population and well over half of its economic activity. Most
analysts believe that it was Guzmán‟s decision to take the
people‟s war to Lima in the late 1980s that galvanized
government and the military to finally make the major
changes in their counterinsurgency strategy which eventually
produced success against the guerrilla forces. Violence at
that time peaked in 1992 with over 60 car bombs. With the
last such attack occurring in Lima almost eight years ago, 13

12

Alberto Bolivar, Confidential conversation with a junior army officer
veteran of the VRAE, Lima, Personal interview, Lima, 18 November,
2009.
13
This was a car bomb that was set off in the El Polo mall, one block
from the U.S. Embassy in Lima, on March 20, 2002, just two days before
President George W. Bush‟s arrival in Lima. Eleven people were killed.
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the sense of urgency, even desperation, so pervasive in the
capital in the early 1990s, is absent today.
A second part of the explanation can be found in the now
outdated counterinsurgency approach that continues to be
based on the military strategy developed in 1989 rather than
a new plan that adopts tactics more responsive to the changes
Sendero has made in the course of its reemergence since
2006.14 According to SL analyst Rubén Vargas, the
government has forgotten that to defeat the guerrillas in the
VRAE, it must first focus on a counter-narcotics strategy,
since the VRAE is where most of Peru‟s cocaine is now
produced and then deal with the insurgents themselves. For
such an approach, the military must have the local
population and local authorities as allies and must send
personnel who both know the local combat scenario and
have experience in irregular warfare.15 A coherent plan that
takes these issues into account would replace the mostly
young and inexperienced troops now being sent with older
veterans and experienced commanding officers. It would
also emphasize military and civilian civic action activities in
close consultation with the local populations. In addition, a
much higher priority would be given to infrastructure
development in the VRAE, including roads, schools, and
health clinics.
A third element relates to human rights issues in a number of
different ways. Military personnel in the field report that
they feel hamstrung by fears that any operations they carry
out will be criticized by human rights groups, so they
14

DIRCOTE (Dirección Contra el Terrorismo) figures on the number of
“terrorist actions” carried out by Shining Path in its three areas of
operations, the VRAE, Upper Huallaga, and Lima, show 175 in 2006, 72
in 2007, 76 in 2008, 102 in 2009, and 136 in 2010. From charts provided
by DIRCOTE to Alberto Bolívar, March 4, 2011.
15
Melissa Pérez, “30 años de Sendero,” Hildebrandt en sus Trece, 3
December, 2010.
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respond by limiting their activities and keeping their patrols
close to their bases.16 Such a response in the field certainly
affects the ability of troops to succeed with their assigned
mission, although, as noted just above, the lack of an
effective and coherent strategy at present also seems to be
part of the problem.
At the same time, the expressed concerns over human rights
issues related to current army operations in the VRAE,
whether justified or not, have a historical basis in abuses
committed by both sides during the government‟s struggle to
overcome the ravages of Sendero’s people‟s war between
1982 and the early 1990s. The Peruvian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (2002-2004) documented over
2000 mass graves in Ayacucho alone.17 Subsequently,
forensic teams, government prosecutors, and nongovernmental groups have uncovered evidence of military
massacres and mass burials in Ayacucho in the 1980s in such
indigenous communities as Putis and within the walls of the
Cabitos army base.18
These efforts to address the consequences of the insurgency
and to find ways to help local survivors to come to terms
with their family members‟ deaths have run up against a less
than enthusiastic response by central government. This
includes restrictions on forensic teams, replacement of
government prosecutors seen as “overly aggressive” in
pursuing human rights abuses, and court cases moved to
Lima from Ayacucho. It is also the case that very few
16

Alberto Bolivar, Interview by David Scott Palmer.
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, “Informe final: Tomo I,
Primera parte: el Proceso, los Hechos y las Victimas,” (Lima: Navarrete),
2004.
18
David Scott Palmer, Multiple interviews, including U.S. and Peruvian
government officials and representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in Lima, Ayacucho, and Washington, D.C. Given the
continuing sensitivity of the issue, names are not provided. July-October,
2008.
17
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individual reparations payments have been made by the
government as yet even though the law requires such
payments to survivors of war victims as a key element of the
reconciliation process. In a most welcome if overdue
development, the government did distribute $5,000,000 in
2010 in one-time $50,000 payments to peasant communities
affected by the violence throughout the sierra. However, the
limitations imposed on uncovering forensic evidence and on
the judicial process have impeded progress on some 14,000
to 15,000 individual claims.19
One explanation offered for such a halfhearted approach,
either to full application of the reconciliation legislation or to
an effective response to renewed Shining Path activity, is
President García‟s fears of possible prosecution for actions
that occurred during his first presidency (1985-1990). Like
ex-President Alberto Fujimori before him, who was
extradited from Chile, tried, and convicted during his current
mandate, the view is that García worries that he, too, might
be held accountable for human rights abuses during his first
term. Several of the mass killings in the sierra, as well as the
death of almost 300 Sendero prisoners at the hands of the
Republican Guards after an uprising in the El Frontón prison
in 1986, are potential swords of Damocles hanging over his
head. Such considerations may well be affecting his
decisions on such issues.20
Finally, similar concerns are expressed over the progressive
release from prison since 2000 of almost 4,000 convicted
insurgents who have completed their sentences, without any
follow-up tracking policy. Official denials notwithstanding,

19

José Coronel, Interview by David Scott Palmer, Ayacucho, 16 August,
2010.
20
José Coronel, Interview by David Scott Palmer.
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there is ample evidence that some of those freed have
returned to participate in Shining Path activities. 21
In spite of such discouraging signs of ineffectiveness in the
government‟s response to the newly energized activities of
Shining Path, the Upper Huallaga valley, where the police
are in charge of eliminating the guerrilla threat, does show
signs of progress. Here Florindo Flores Hala (aka Artemio),
the lone member of Shining Path‟s Central Committee still at
large, is in charge of operations designed to reestablish
support among local peasants, largely coca growers, while at
the same time gathering revenues from the production and
trafficking of cocaine to support Sendero operations. Over
the past year or so, the same police who successfully tracked
and captured Guzmán in 1992 have headed operations in the
valley and have rounded up or killed several of the key
subordinates of Artemio. In fact, they have also come very
close to bringing in Artemio himself. These police-directed
operations in the Upper Huallaga demonstrate that it is
indeed possible to pursue a successful counterinsurgency
strategy against the armed remnants of Shining Path. In so
doing, they place into sharp relief the contrasting failed
efforts of the military to do the same in the VRAE. 22
THE SENDEROS AT A CROSSROADS
Beyond Shining Path‟s current challenges in the Upper
Huallaga, there are other issues in play that limit its ability to
pursue the once more long-term objective of eventual
accession to power through the people‟s war. The
organization, while more coordinated than it has been in
some years by the ability of Abimael Guzmán to
21

Periodic newspaper accounts relate apprehensions in Lima and several
provinces of convicted SL militants who have been involved in local
organizing and armed attacks.
22
Gustavo Goritti, “Sendero en el Huallaga,” IDL-Reporteros, 9 July,
2010.
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communicate with militants in the field, is itself divided.
These divisions go back more than fifteen years, to 1993,
when Guzmán acknowledged military defeat and asked for a
peace agreement. This decision produced a break between
militants who accepted his conclusion and those who vowed
to continue the armed struggle unabated. This tension
between Sendero remnants has continued over the years.
With increased activity by militants and sympathizers,
however, it is now more visible to the outsider.
At this time, there are three distinct groups of Shining Path
supporters. The Lima contingent is led by chief spokesperson
Alfredo Crespo, Guzmán‟s lead lawyer, along with legal
colleague Manuel Fajardo, and engages in efforts to free
militants still in jail, a general amnesty campaign, and
expanding networks of supporters in universities and unions.
The Upper Huallaga group is led by Artemio, and includes
“Rubén” and a number of others known only by their aliases.
The VRAE organization is led by José, with other principal
figures including Orlando Alejandro Borda Casafranca, aka
Alipio, Jorge Quispe Palomino, aka Raúl (José‟s brother),
Rolando Cabezas Figueroa, aka Guillermo, and several more
also known only by their aliases.
The first two groups continue to accept Guzmán‟s leadership
and guidance in emphasizing a political solution in the
shorter term, including a general amnesty. However, the
guerrillas in the VRAE reject his leadership in favor of a
military solution in the context of the ongoing armed
struggle, and have demonstrated their disdain by sentencing
Guzmán to death.23 Recent evidence of what might have
started out as efforts to bridge the gap between the two
armed wings (estimated together to total about 450 armed
23

VRAE Facción, “Balance de la primera contra-campaña política y
militar, de la Guerra Popular
Democrática, de resistencia nacional antiimperialista yanqui,” November
2008. (Un-Published Document.)
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militants), with leaders who worked closely together at one
time but are now antagonists, indicates that these efforts
failed completely. When José sent Félix Huachaca Tincopa,
aka Roberto, to the Upper Huallaga in February 2010 to
make contact with Artemio and coordinate actions, his offer
was refused. José then instructed Roberto to kill Artemio, but
he was captured by police (in December 2010) before he
could do so.24
The Lima-based Shining Path supporters, following a very
different course in their peaceful pursuit of a set of citizen
front organizations, have had some success in regenerating
relationships with sympathizers in several Lima and sierra
universities, unions, and regional defense groups. They have
also organized marches and protests in favor of granting a
general amnesty which would include both Guzmán and,
ironically, former president Fujimori and military offenders
as well. The concomitant efforts of their lawyers‟
organization to register a political party sympathetic to the
group‟s causes have failed, however, at least for now.
The hope was to gain legal recognition for the Amnesty and
Fundamental Rights Movement (MOVADEF) to be able to
participate in the April 2011 elections. Although organizers
gathered more than the requisite 150,000 signatures, these
were deemed to have been submitted too close to the
registration deadline for verification. Even so, the group‟s
ability to garner that number of citizens at least willing to let
a Shining Path-sympathizing party appear on the ballot
(assuming most of the signatures are genuine) may suggest
that the non-violent approach is gaining traction.
Such support is suggested by MOVADEF‟s first congress,
organized in November 2010 to begin the process of
collecting sufficient signatures to register as a political party.
24

Peru.21, 2010.
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The gathering was attended by more than 200 delegates from
several Lima lower class districts, including Villa El
Salvador, San Juan de Miraflores, San Juan de Lurigancho,
Independencia, and Comas. There were also representatives
from the departments of Puno, Ancash, Arequipa, Ayacucho,
Apurímac, Junín, Tumbes, and Piura, as well as from the
public universities of San Marcos and Callao.25
MOVADEF has also carried out a number of legal initiatives
in what has turned out to be a successful effort to free from
jail several hundred former cadres of Sendero and the now
defunct Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru
(MRTA).26 DIRCOTE sources have registered their concerns
that those freed failed to pay the civil reparations required
under the law, thereby demoralizing Peruvian police forces.27
The armed faction of Shining Path based in the coca-rich
Upper Huallaga valley (UHV), whose leader Artemio
continues to adhere to “Gonzalo (i.e., Guzmán) thought” and
to accept his prison-based guidance, is under constant
harassment by police forces. Several important Sendero
lieutenants in the valley have been rounded up in recent
months, though Artemio continues to elude capture.
Even so, there is evidence of some level of continuing
support for the group by local farmers, one of its prime
objectives, as well as of resources for the organization
generated by revenues from drug production and trafficking.
These resources are crucial to Shining Path‟s continued
efforts to rebuild both the armed and popular support
generating components of the organization. There is no
question that police operations in the UHV threaten the
25

Melissa Pérez, “30 años de Sendero,” p. 5.
Daniel Yovera, “Poder Judicial libera a ex mandos de Sendero y
MRTA,” Perú 21, 13 August, 2009.
27
Daniel Yovera, “Poder Judicial libera a ex mandos de Sendero y
MRTA.”
26
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finances that currently undergird the pro-Guzmán segments
of Sendero; their continued success in the valley, whether
they capture Artemio or not, would be a major blow to the
organization.
The segment of Shining Path based in the VRAE, which is
roundly opposed to the strategic assessment and tactical line
pursued by its once dominant head, is at this moment in a
much better position to advance the approach the militants
have been following for at least the past five years. This
includes close collaboration with the local population by
some members.28 At the same time, others, making up the
armed cadre, attack army patrols and bases and protect
carriers of cocaine on roads and trails out of the valleys over
the sierra to the coast.29
The difficult jungle terrain is one major handicap for
government forces, while limitations of leadership and the
counterinsurgency approach adopted, as well as the lack of
central authority priority further limit their success. At the
same time, the Sendero cadre in the VRAE, while still
ascendant there, do not appear at this juncture to be moving
very far beyond the valleys to expand their operations or
influence with other local rural communities.
Our assessment of the future dynamics of Shining Path is
that the organization, or more correctly, the organizations, is
at a crossroads. Both the dissident branch continuing the
armed struggle in the VRAE and the group based in Lima
that is focusing on gaining popular support and filling
political space on the left are slowly gaining momentum.
This ideological and tactical split certainly weakens
28

U.S. Embassy, Peru “Confidential Cable 236863: Scenesetter for
USSOUTHCOM Commander, General Douglas M. Fraser” Wikileaks,
25 November, 2009. (Made public by Wikileaks, 2010.)
29
Oscar Libón, “Sendero Luminoso en el VRAE,” Correo, 13 January,
2011.
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Sendero’s overall ability to advance. In addition, the capacity
of the Guzmán- supporting armed wing of SL in the UHV is
declining, and the dissident Proseguir faction in the VRAE
still seems to be limited in its range of operations beyond the
jungle valleys. One possibility that could emerge from these
current dynamics, given the advances made by MOVADEF
in trying to enter the national, regional, and local political
arenas, is a slowly progressing Shining Path mutation that in
time finds a legitimate place within Peru‟s national political
system.
CONCLUSION
As our analysis has suggested, government‟s response is a
key consideration in any assessment of Shining Path‟s future.
So far, official actions have indicated that the government is
not yet prepared to provide the necessary overall response
that would eliminate the latent threat the group poses, so
Sendero could easily continue to grow. At the same time,
SL’s repressive history among the very peasant groups it is
now trying to work with to regain support is likely to limit
any expansion, especially in the central-south sierra in and
around Ayacucho.
For the government, its successes in the UHV demonstrate
that the guerrilla threat can be reduced. Even so central
government authorities are not yet willing to refine their
response to an emerging within-system Shining Path
presence and cannot yet see the potential benefits that
allowing the organization to operate as a political party
might bring. Public opinion is also overwhelmingly opposed
to any legalization of the group‟s political front. Even though
the national SL party possibility was off the table for the
2011 national elections, it is very likely that Senderosympathizing political groups or alliances will be
increasingly involved in local and regional elections and will
have some success. As far as the military side of SL is
18

concerned, the continuation of low level and regionally
delimited insurgency is the most likely short- to mediumterm scenario. In conclusion, our overall assessment at this
time is that Shining Path will continue a slow expansion of
its political wing but is unlikely to reemerge as a significant
military threat at any point in the foreseeable future.
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